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RECENT DECISIONS
title in the manner herein discussed has been recognized as a device
whereby a spouse may effect what amounts to a testamentary
disposition. 24
In view of the basis upon which the presumption rests, it is sub-
mitted that the Court should have applied it if there was no evidence
of an intent to create a present one-half interest in the husband. If
the transferees were strangers to each other, there would be no rea-
son to suppose that the intent was to create such right of survivor-
ship. But where they are husband and wife, it is submitted that such
an intent has been justifiably presumed. During their joint lives,
spouses may, and usually do, enjoy mutually the benefits of property
owned by one or the other. For all practical purposes, the funds
realized upon a chose in action owned by one of the spouses would
find their way to the family purse. It seems reasonable, therefore,
to presume that the transfers herein discussed are motivated by con-
cern for the future welfare and security of the surviving spouse. If,
in a given case, it is claimed that a gift of a present interest was in-
tended, it is not unreasonable to require evidence of such an intent
in order to rebut the presumption.
TORTS - BAT-rERY ACTION AGAINST FIvE YEAR OLD Cuna
UPHEL..-The plaintiff brought an action against a five year old for
battery. The defendant moved a chair and seated himself therein.
As the plaintiff was about to sit where the chair had been, defendant
attempted to place the chair under her. He was unable to do so and
the plaintiff sustained injury. On appeal from a judgment for the
defendant, the Supreme Court of Washington remanded, holding that,
if the defendant had knowledge to a substantial certainty that the
plaintiff would attempt to sit down, he would be liable for battery.
Garratt v. Dailey, 146 Wash. Dec. 186, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
Generally, infants are liable for their torts.1 However, if the
tort contains some element which is necessarily wanting in an infant,
he will not be liable.2 Because liability is ordinarily imposed without
regard to the moral quality of the act,3 tender years, of itself, is no
24 See Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453, 300 N.Y. Supp. 319 (3d Dep't
1937), aff'd inero., 278 N.Y. 563, 16 N.E.2d 103 (1938).
1 See, e.g., Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829);
Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 237 (1863) ; see CoOLEY, ToRTs 120 (3d ed. 1906).
2 Stephens v. Stephens, 172 Ky. 780, 189 S.W. 1143, 1145 (1916) (dictum) ;
Swoboda v. Nowak, 213 Mo. App. 452, 255 S.W. 1079, 1082 (1923) (dictum);
see PROSSER, TORTS 1086 (1941).
3 See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953).
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defense.4 Consequently, infants have been held liable for battery, 5
trespass, 6 and conversion." The reason advanced for imposing lia-
bility without knowledge of wrongfulness is that the law of torts is
primarily interested in compensating the injured party.8
This rule governing the tort liability of infants has sometimes
been reached through legislation,9 but more generally has evolved
through judicial decision 10 and has been adopted by the Restate-
ment." Georgia, however, limits liability by statute to infants over
ten years.' 2  Although the New York decisions have asserted the
general rule, it is noteworthy that in these cases the infant was of
such an age as to have the capacity to know the wrongfulness of the
act.'8 This factual limitation appears also in the cases decided in
other jurisdictions.' 4  There seem to be only three cases holding an
infant under seven liable for battery-one an English case decided
in 1457.'" It is the view of English textwriters, however, that today
an infant of tender years is not liable for acts of aggression unless he
has the capacity to know the wrongfulness of the act. 16
The imposition of liability without regard to wrongfulness seems
to be a vestige of the absolute liability had at early common law,
17
4 Huchting v. Engel, supra note 1; Paul v. Hummel, 43 Mo. 119, 122 (1868)
(dictum).
5 See, e.g., Bullock v. Babcock, supra note 1; Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind.
130 (1877).
6 See, e.g., Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859); Scott
v. Watson, 46 Me. 362 (1859); Huchting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 237 (1863).
7 See, e.g., Shaw v. Coffin, 58 Me. 254 (1870); Walker v. Davis, 67 Mass.
(1 Gray) 506 (1854); Pledge v. Griffith, 199 Mo. App. 303, 202 S.W. 460
(1918).
8 Ellis v. lYAngelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675, 677 (1953)
(dictum) ; see COOLEY, TORTS 114 (3d ed. 1906) ; PROSSER, TORTS 1085 (1941).
9 CAL. Civ. CODE § 41 (Deering, 1950) ; LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1785, 1874, 2227
(Dainow, 1947).
10 See cases cited notes 5-7 spra, 13, 14 infra.
11 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 887, comment a (1939).
12 GA. CODE tit. 105, § 105-1806; tit. 26, §26-302 (1933), Riggs v. Watson,
77 Ga. App. 62, 47 S.E.2d 900 (1948); Clemons v. Olshine, 54 Ga. App. 290,
187 S. E. 711 (1936).
13 See, e.g., Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 22 N.E.2d 254 (1939) (16 years);
Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1859) (14 years) ; Bullock
v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (12 years).
14 See, e.g., Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130 (1877) (13 years) ; Humphrey
v. Douglass, 10 Vt. 71 (1838) (15 years) ; Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523,
50 N.W. 403 (1891) (12 years).
15 See Ellis v. D'Angelo, 116 Cal. App.2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953) ; Magee
v. Willing, 31 LEGAL INTELL. 37 (1874) (which reports the charge to the jury)
Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. llb, pl. 18 (1457).
1r See POLLOCK, TORTS 47 (15th ed., Landon 1951) (However, Landon is of
a different view.); SALMOND, TORTS 71 (11th ed. 1953); Cook, Mental Defi-
ciency In Relation To Tort, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 333, 346 (1921).
17 See Weaver v. Ward, Hob. 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616);
Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. llb, pl. 18 (1457); 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAw 375 (3d ed. 1927).
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when the courts looked merely to cause and effect.18 Consequently,
the early law was formal and "unmoral." 19 The justification for
absolute liability was that if a loss must be borne by one of two inno-
cent persons, it should be borne by the actor.20 The rule imposing
liability upon infants seems to be nothing more than a sophisticated
refinement of that ancient doctrine.21 The law concerning adults,
however, has radically changed, and the "unmoral" standard has been
replaced by the imposition of liability based on wrongfulness. 22 This
standard, to be an effective test of liability, must be objective, i.e.,
would an average man know the act was wrongful.m
The effect of the incapacity of infants for wrongfulness has been
recognized where they have assumed the role of plaintiff.24 Thus,
for example, where an infant was injured through the negligence of
a railroad, he was not barred from recovery because of his trespass.25
The court there remarked, ". . . they [infants] are not willful tres-
passers, knowingly doing a wrong . . . which could legally charge
them... [with] personal responsibility, as in the case of older persons
not under such disability." 26
In the area of negligence it has been held that an infant is not
subject to the same standard of care as an adult,27 because of the
infant's limited capacity to foresee the consequences of his acts.28  It
is submitted that this limited capacity makes it equally impossible for
an infant of tender years to realize the necessity of refraining from
acts of aggression.29  Accordingly, capacity for wrongfulness should
be a factor in determining the liability of infants for intentional torts 30
18 See Y.B. Mich. 35 Hen. 6, f. llb, pl. 18 (1457) ; Wigmore, Responsibility
For Tortious Acts: Its History-IlI, 7 HARv. L. REV. 441, 442 (1894).
19 See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HAv. L. REv. 97 (1908).
20 See Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593, 600, 102 Eng. Rep. 724, 727 (K.B. 1803);
Lambert & Olliot v. Bessey, Raym. T. 421, 422, 83 Eng. Rep. 220, 221 (K.B.
1681).
21 See Bohlen, Liability In Tort Of Infants And Insane Persons, 23 MICH.
L. REv. 9, 12 (1924).
22See Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); Ames, supra
note 19, at 99.
23 See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 108-11 (1881).
24 See, e.g., Railroad Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873) ; Perry
v. Tonopah Mining Co., 13 F.2d 865 (D. Nev. 1915).
25 Huggett v. Erb, 182 Mich. 524, 148 N.W. 805 (1914).
26 Id. at 808-09 (emphasis added).
27 See, e.g., Verni v. Johnson, 295 N.Y. 436, 68 N.E.2d 431 (1946) ; Day v.
Cunningham, 125 Me. 328, 133 AtI. 855 (1926); Bentson v. Brown, 186 Wis.
629, 203 N.W. 380 (1925).
28 See, e.g., Lederer v. Connecticut Co., 95 Conn. 520, 111 Atl. 785 (1920);
Siedlik v. Schneider, 122 Neb. 763, 241 N.W. 535 (1932); Charbonneau v.
MacRury, 84 N.H. 501, 153 At. 457 (1931); Shaske v. Hron, 266 Wis. 384,
63 N.W.2d 706 (1954).
29 See Bohlen, Liability In Tort Of Infants And Insane Persons. 23 MICH.
L. REV. 9, 32-33 (1924).
30 See Ridley v. Young, 64 Cal. App.2d 503, 149 P.2d 76, 80 (1944);
Unkelsbee v. Homestead Fire Ins. Co., 41 A.2d 168, 170 (D.C. Munic. Ct. 1945).
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in the same manner that mental capacity determines responsibility in
the area of negligence.
The Court in the instant case did not consider the defendant's
capacity to know wrongfulness, and merely stated that liability for
battery was predicated on intent to establish the contact.3 1 It was
asserted that the defendant's age was relevant only to determine what
he was capable of knowing in reference to the certainty of the contact,
and from that knowledge the necessary intent could be inferred.
It is submitted that the ultimate basis of tort liability is wrong-
fulness.32 However, since the law must operate with externals as
its guide, knowledge of wrongfulness has been translated into the
objective, average man concept.-m Consequently, where the act is
found to have been done intentionally, the law presumes the moral
factor and imposes liability.3 4  It is indisputable that this judicial
technique is just, where the defendant has capacity for wrongfulness.
But where the defendant is incapable of knowing wrong, moral re-
sponsibility is no longer a possibility; it therefore cannot be presumed.
Only a fiction can attribute moral significance to the physical act.
The Court in the instant case should have required a finding as to
whether or not infants of the defendant's age would have known the
act was wrongful. The effect of failing to make such a finding is to
impose absolute liability on infants in an area of the law where such
should not be the rule.
A
TORTS- DISPARAGEMENT OF PROPERTY- MISSTATEMENT OF
PRICE NOT AcTIONABLE.-Plaintiff marketed a toy airplane which
sold for $3.00. The defendant, in a fictional motion picture, depicted
the toy as selling for $.65. Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that such
representation constituted disparagement of property. The Appellate
Division held, per curiam, that a cause of action was not stated in the
absence of allegations showing how the misstatement of price accom-
plished disparagement of quality. Marxman Pipes, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 285 App. Div. 135, 135 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1st Dep't
1954).
Disparagement of property is a form of interference with eco-
nomic relations. The earliest cases, arising shortly before 1600, in-
volved oral aspersions cast upon the ownership of realty, thereby
31 See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 16, comment a (1929).
32 See Radin, Speculative Inquiry Into The Nature Of Torts, 21 TEXAS L.
REv. 697 (1943).
33 See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 161-63 (1881).3 4 Id. at 108.
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